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New Developments or More of the Same? A Historical, Political, and Sociological Look at
Missouri’s Sex Offender Laws from 1995 to 2013.

Abstract
The Republican controlled Missouri General Assembly passed HB 301 in 2013 only to have it
vetoed by Democratic Governor Jay Nixon. The bill would have eliminated certain juvenile
offenders from the sex offender registry allowing for the removal of first time juvenile
offenders. This raises some general questions about legal developments associated with
the punishment and surveillance of sex offender in Missouri. What are the general trends
of sex offender laws and how does HB 301 fit with these trends? How do current political
and sociological theories of policy creation explain the actions surrounding Missouri’s HB
301? A historical analysis of bills passed by the Missouri General Assembly, Missouri
newspaper articles, the political makeup of the Missouri General Assembly and governor’s
office, and crime statistics from 1995 to 2013 produced three essential themes in
understanding the formation of sex offender laws: the concern over public safety, the
perception of sex offenders, and the politics of lawmaking. The governor used public safety
to defend his veto, while proponents of HB 301 used the perception of sex offenders to
push for HB 301. The politics of the parties involved add another dimension to the
understanding of HB 301.
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Introduction
Crime rates have declined since the mid-1990s (Rosenfeld, 2011). Despite the
decrease in crime rates, many American states continued to incarcerate and punish
offenders at rates much higher than other nations and higher than the nation’s history
(Campbell & Schoenfeld, 2013). Policies such as zero tolerance laws and increasing
mandatory sentences for criminals continued to be the common political rhetoric touted
(Beckett & Sasson, 2004). Both political parties across the nation jumped on the “tough on
crime” bandwagon in recent decades (Campbell & Schoenfeld, 2013; Alexander, 2010).
Then in 2013, the Missouri General Assembly passed House Bill 301, which would have
removed juvenile offenders from the sex offender registry. Even though it passed with an
overwhelming majority in the state legislature, the governor vetoed the bill. Opponents of
the bill, including the governor, argued that the bill is “soft” on sex offenders by allowing
their names to be removed from the Missouri sex offender registry. Supporters of the bill
claimed that sex offender laws have become too broad and that not everyone on the
registry should be on the registry for the rest of his or her life. The bill’s fate was ultimately
linked to partisan dynamics in which Republicans controlled the state’s General Assembly
while Democrat Jay Nixon was governor. HB 301’s trajectory provided an important case
for better understanding the current status of partisan dynamics associated with crime
policy.
The actions surrounding HB 301 presented unique questions which this paper
sought to answer. What are the current trends in sex offender laws and how does HB 301
fit in with those trends? How do current sociological and political theories of policy creation
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explain the actions surrounding HB 301? In order answer these questions a historical
analysis approach is used. Since the issue with the most contention in HB 301 deals with
removing people from the sex offender registry, the period of examination began with
Missouri initiating its sex offender registry in 1995. By looking at the bills concerning sex
offenders passed between 1995 and the passing of HB 301 in 2013, certain theories
concerning the creation of criminal justice policies were brought into play.
The literature pointed out many and various theories about the creation of criminal
justice policies and especially those policies dealing with sex offenders. There were many
explanations as to why punitive criminal justice policies were implemented. The literature
revealed and this manuscript analyzed three major themes that motivate sex offender laws:
the concern about public safety, the perception of sex offenders, and the politics of
lawmaking. In order to accurately examine these theories and understand the sex offender
laws in Missouri, reading the bills and other media outlets at the time the bills passed was
important. This study examined bills passed by the Missouri General Assembly from 1995
to 2013 and analyzed newspaper articles from the same time period. Furthermore, the
political makeup of the Missouri General Assembly and the governor’s office provided
further comprehension of the situation. Finally, statistics provided by the Uniform Crime
Report and the Missouri State Highway Patrol on the number of rapes, victims, and offenses
related to sex offenses offered additional insights.
Several conclusions were made after examining the bills, the newspaper articles,
political makeup, and statistics. First, lawmakers emphasized public safety in sex offender
legislation. Lawmakers repeatedly used the language of creating safe communities and
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keeping children safe to bolster support for punitive bills regarding sex offenders. Second,
the perception of sex offenders played an important part. While initially public safety and
the perception of sex offenders went hand in hand, these themes seemed to be at odds
with each other at the time of HB 301. Finally, the politics of lawmaking added another
dimension to the analysis. Evidence showed that prior to the passage of HB 301, national
influences created a bipartisan effort to come down extremely tough on sex offenders.
However, at the time of HB 301 the traditional beliefs of partisan crime control politicking
were called into question. The advancement and progressiveness of sex offender laws were
pitted against the traditional punitive attitude in dealing with sex offenders.
Literature Review
The creation of policies in the criminal justice realm may seem to be a very complex
ordeal. However, Sample and Kadleck (2008) stated that isolated incidents of crime drive
public fear which in turn draws the attention of political figures. Once political figures are
aware of a public demand for action, they introduce new laws and reforms to show
constituents that lawmakers are willing to address concerns which helps to ensure
lawmaker’s re-election (Sample & Kadleck, 2008). In support, Galeste, Fradella, and Vogel
(2012) found that “public officials’ personal perceptions concerning sex offenders were
significantly shaped by the media and influenced both the passage and content of
legislation,” (14). Certain crimes and victims created the greatest public arousal. The sex
offender and their offenses were at the top of crimes that elicited the most intense public
response. Sometimes the public believes that they have a better idea of how to deal with
sex offenders than government officials (Fox, 2013). Understanding the public’s moral
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outrage gave an indication as to why lawmakers initiate and sponsor various bills. Public
outcry for changes make lawmakers accountable to the public (Sample & Kadleck, 2008).
Public outrage explained the motivation for laws that established long prison sentences and
lifelong stigmas attached to certain offenders. The relevant literature indicated three main
explanations for the evolution of sex offender laws: the concern over public safety, the
perception of sex offenders, and the politics of lawmaking.
Public Safety
Concern about public safety certainly drove the production of criminal justice
policies, especially sex offender policies. Public safety usually revolved around the
protection of potential victims. Women and children make up the typical victims for sex
offenses. The public views children as innocent thus, creating a strong outcry against those
who harm children. Children are considered to be a population that should be protected
(Mancini & Mears, 2010). As Zimring (2004) stated, children and youth “lack the capacity to
judge the intentions of others or to defend themselves from the sexual aggression of
exploitative adults,” (26). Sexual offenses against children elicited a panic sensation among
the public which is then translated to policy decisions (Galeste, Fradella, & Vogel, 2012).
Pickett, Mancini, and Mears (2013) found that individuals are inclined to be more punitive
when they believe that young children make up a large portion of sex crime victims and also
that these victims suffer more than victims of other crimes. Some research suggested the
public feels sex offenders who molest children are deserving of the harshest penalties (Jung
et. al. 2012). Mancini and Mears (2010) again suggested that highly publicized sex offense
cases involving child victims make the public push for harsher sentences including the
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execution of sex offenders. In a study of North Carolina sex offenders, Page, Hill, and
Gilbert (2012) found that “97% of victims were less than 18 years of age and five percent
were 5 years old or younger,” (114). There is such general loathing of sex offenders whose
victims are children that even prisoners view these sex offenders as the lowest of the low
(Ricciardelli & Moir, 2013).
Laws restricting where sex offenders can live resulted from the concern over public
safety and the need to protect children. These laws often stated that registered sex
offenders cannot live within so many feet of schools, daycares, playgrounds, and other such
places. In essence, this limited areas of where registered sex offenders can live and creates
clusters of registered sex offenders (Socia, 2013). Socia (2013) showed how proximity of
registered sex offenders to each other did not impact recidivism rates, but those counties
with an uneven distribution of registered sex offenders did lead to an increase in recidivism
against adult victims. There may be some validation for these living restrictions. Keeping
registered sex offenders away from children helped keep recidivism down involving child
victims, but increased recidivism involving adult victims (Socia, 2013). However, sexual
offenders themselves do not feel that residential restrictions prevent reoffending (Page,
Hill, & Gilbert, 2012). This finding indicated that if sex offenders are motivated to reoffend,
they will find a way to reoffend despite the residential restrictions. Furthermore, Page, Hill,
and Gilbert (2012) stated that residential restrictions may not be very effective because
most sex offenders know their victims rather than targeting complete strangers. Even the
general public does not feel that residential restrictions are very effective in preventing
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sexual abuse and in limiting sex offender’s access to children (Katz-Schiavone & Jeglic,
2009).
Galeste, Fradella & Vogel (2012) suggested that sex offender registration laws came
into effect because of highly sensationalized incidents involving children. On the surface,
these laws are thought to make it easier for law enforcement agencies to keep track of
convicted sex offenders who have been released from confinement. While that may be
true to a certain extent, sex offender registration laws serve another purpose. Registration
laws allow communities to protect themselves and their children from sex offenders by
knowing where such sex offenders are living (Galeste, Fradella, & Vogel, 2012). Simon
(1998) suggestsed that these registration laws give communities the power to police
themselves rather than relying completely on the state to do so. Echoing this sentiment,
Page, Hill, and Gilbert (2012) stated that the main goal of sex offender legislation is the
protection of communities, especially children.
Perception of Sex Offenders
The perception of sex offenders also contributed to the construction of sex offender
policies. One of these perceptions is that sex offenders are incurable and unreformable.
Pickett, Mancini, and Mears (2013) found that individuals are more punitive toward sex
offenders when they believe sex offenders are unreformable. In fact, Pickett, Mancini, and
Mears (2013) found this belief of unreformability to be the most important factor in
creating resentment and aggression toward sex offenders. Many of these perceptions
come from the media and can play an important role in the formation of policy. Galeste,
Fradella, and Vogel (2012) found that sex offender articles in newspapers often reported
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the myths of sex offenders as actual facts. These newspaper articles often present sex
offenders as “being incapable of benefitting from treatment,” (Galeste, Fradella, & Vogel,
2012: 14). Those who believed that sex offenders are bound to recidivate supported
harsher penalties including the possibility of executing sex offenders (Mancini & Mears,
2010).
Another perception of sex offenders is that most offenses, especially those
committed against children, are committed by strangers. Yet, this may not be the case
because “sex crimes involving child victims are less likely to involve strangers and more
likely to involve acquaintances or family members,” (Socia, 2013: 545). Additionally, Page,
Hill, and Gilbert (2012) found that less than 25% of sex offender respondents reported
victimizing a stranger. While this study only examined North Carolina sex offenders, it
provided evidence that sex offenses are rarely committed by strangers. Along with this
perception that sex offenders are strangers, there is the belief that if sex offenders are
allowed to live near children, schools, daycares, and playgrounds, they will not be able to
control themselves leading to the commission of another sex offense (Galeste, Fradella, &
Vogel, 2012). Even sex offenders themselves believe that society and the criminal justice
system view registered sex offenders as “heinous, violent, and dangerous,” (Tewksbury &
Lees, 2006: 327).
The belief that sex offenders are bound to reoffend and incurable led to longer
sentences and harsher penalties. These sentencing policies seem to be geared toward the
prevention of sex offender recidivism by keeping them behind bars or in some sort of
confinement. By believing these perceptions of sex offenders, the public has certain
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attitudes toward sex offenders including the feeling that sex offenders do not have rights
upon conviction (Katz-Schiavone & Jeglic, 2009). However, these attitudes may vary
according to the nature of the crime committed by sex offenders. Jung et. al. (2012) found
that “laypersons perceived risk of general recidivism differently among the three types of
offenders,” (234). In fact, finding recidivism rates for sex offenders helps determine what
type of sex offenders reoffend. In actuality, a majority of sex offenders are not convicted of
new sex offenses after release (Bench & Allen, 2013). Similar to other offenders, after
turning the age of 44 there is a downward trend in recidivism of sex offenders (Bench &
Allen, 2013).
In addition to spurring harsher penalties, the perception of sex offenders helped
generate the demand for sex offender registries. Sex offender registries are another way
for law enforcement agencies to add an additional level of surveillance on sex offenders.
The sex offender registry is the middle ground between locking up sex offenders indefinitely
and letting them go free after confinement (Miller, 2013). The public strongly believes that
sex offender registration laws make communities safer (Katz-Schiavone & Jeglic, 2009). The
1990s saw an extremely vigorous and speedy movement for states to implement sex
offender registries (Galeste, Fradella, & Vogel, 2012). These registration laws led to labeling
sex offenders, made sex offenders obvious to the public, and generated a general feeling of
loathing by the public toward sex offenders (Tewksbury & Lees, 2006). Katz-Schiavone and
Jeglic (2009) found that the public supports registry laws, believing that such laws are not
an invasion of privacy. Whether or not the public believes registries reduce recidivism
rates, the registries do keep the community informed of where sex offenders live (Katz-
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Schiavone & Jeglic, 2009). Knowledge of where sex offenders live allows parents to take
necessary steps to keep their children away from sex offenders.
Contrary to the traditional perception of sex offenders, juveniles do commit sex
offenses. Laws are designed and instituted in order to deal with these juveniles accordingly.
The irony here is that most juvenile sex offender laws are very similar to adult sex offender
laws, meaning that those committing sex offenses are from the same group of people the
laws are designed to protect (Miller, 2013). Most laws in regard to juveniles are designed to
rehabilitate and give them a chance to succeed as adults; whereas juvenile sex offender
laws often produce the lifelong stigmatization similar to that of adult sex offender laws
(Miller, 2013). However, Miller (2013) pointed out that juveniles with sex offenses often
pose no risk for future sexual offending. Zimring (2004) found that only about four to eight
percent of juvenile sex offenders recidivate. Similarly, Christiansen and Vincent (2013)
found that in their sample of over 39,000 juveniles prior sexual offending is not a positive
predictor of another sexual offense. The evidence suggested that juvenile sex offenders
reoffend at very low rates in terms of sex offenses.
Politics of Lawmaking
Politicians suggested and promoted certain policies, and it is important to
understand their motives. Politicians want to get re-elected and thus, pay attention to
public opinion polls. Polls showing public support for certain issues create a mandate for
legislative action (Unnever, Cullen, & Fischer, 2005; Erikson, 1976). Stimson, Mackuen, and
Erickson (1995) found that “each point in public opinion produces about a third of a point
change in the overall policy of the federal government,” (557). However, “some research
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suggests that criminal justice policymaking is merely symbolic gestures by lawmakers to
appease the voting public and ensure their re-election,” (Meloy, Boatwright, & Curtis, 2013:
617). This gives the public assurance that something is being done in order to control crime.
Also, politicians need tangible results in order to proclaim success of the policies they enact.
Most of these tangible results are arrest, conviction, and imprisonment rates. Whether
these policies are actually reducing crime is not as important as showing that something is
being done to control crime.
The desire for re-election by showing tangible results of policies helped create a
bipartisan consensus on the crime control issue. Research suggested that conservatives
generally tended to be more punitive than liberals (Nicholson-Crotty, Peterson, & Ramirez,
2009; Ramirez, 2013). However, the 1990s saw both political parties trending toward more
punitive policies and adopting “tough” on crime stances (Nicholson-Crotty, Peterson, &
Ramirez, 2009). While both parties may have adopted tough on crime stances, Smith (2004)
found that the “greater percentage of legislative seats held by Democrats, the lower the
incarceration rate,” (934). While this study only examined incarceration rates as a measure
for punitive criminal justice policies, it may give some indication that Democrats are still
slightly more lenient in crime control policies than Republicans. However, Campbell and
Schoenfeld (2013) showed a general consensus between the political parties over time
instead of during a singular time period. The interaction between national developments
with state and local situations helped generate a more punitive consensus on crime control
policies (Campbell & Schoenfeld, 2013).
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In terms of sex offender laws, some research attempted to understand politicians’
motives for the laws they promote. It follows logically that because the protection of
victims and the perception of sex offenders often drive sex offender laws, politicians would
unanimously sponsor and support punitive sex offender laws. Sample and Kadleck (2008)
found that some politicians hold the belief that punitive policies are still the way to go, but
other politicians feel that sex offender laws are too broad. Meloy, Boatwright, and Curtis
(2013) also found that a majority of the policymakers, in their study, believe that sex
offender laws achieved their intended goals, despite their unintended consequences.
Current Study
The literature identified three main factors that play a part in the creation of sex
offender laws; the concern over public safety, the perception of sex offenders, and the
politics of lawmaking. This transcript next examined as to whether these concepts hold true
in the actions surrounding HB 301. Questions are developed in order to explain the actions
surrounding HB 301. What are the current trends in sex offender policies, and how does HB
301 fit into those trends? How do current sociological and political theories of policy
creation, particularly public safety, perception of sex offenders, and the politics of
lawmaking, explain the actions surrounding HB 301?
Missouri presented a unique case study to answer these questions because of HB
301. To recap, in 2013 the Republican controlled Missouri General Assembly passed House
Bill No. 301. HB 301 would have removed certain juvenile sex offenders from the registry.
However, the Democratic governor vetoed the bill. Certain members of the Missouri
General Assembly promised to bring the bill to the veto session late in 2013 in an attempt
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to override the governor’s veto. However, when it came time for the veto session, these
same members decided not to attempt to override the veto for various reasons. Even
though HB 301 did not become law in Missouri, its initial passage through the General
Assembly provides interesting insight into the sex offender policy making process.
Methodology
This transcript used a historical analysis approach in order to answer the questions
posed above. The outcome of HB 301 is known. It did not become law. Therefore, looking
back through history was the logical approach needed to understand HB 301. HB 301
cannot be analyzed in isolation and must be understood within the larger context of
Missouri’s sex offender legislative history. A historical analysis gives the context needed to
understand the actions surrounding HB 301. This analysis began with the passage of
Missouri’s sex offender registry in 1995 and ended with the legislature passing and the
governor vetoing HB 301 in 2013. A periodization technique is also used to analyze the
twenty years of legislative developments covered in this study. Analyzing developments
within the specific time periods that emerged from the historical narrative facilitated a
more focused account that emphasized key themes associated with public safety,
perception of sex offenders, and the politics of lawmaking. After determining the presence
and influence of each of these concepts in each period, the overarching themes from each
time period can be established. This helped to understand how HB 301 fit into the history
of Missouri’s sex offender legislation.
After establishing the time frame of the study, a search was conducted to identify all
relevant pieces of proposed and enacted legislation relevant to Missouri’s sex offender
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registry. The Missouri General Assembly’s website lists all bills that are truly passed and
agreed upon for each year. After bills were identified they were systematically analyzed for
content to determine what the primary purpose of the legislation was and how it
corresponded to previous and subsequent legislation. For example, legislation was analyzed
to determine whether it criminalized activity, increased punishments, added registry
requirements, or added living restrictions. These data were used to determine the degree
of punitiveness for each piece of legislation. Table 1 presents the 20 bills that were found
and examined (See Appendix A). Additionally, a one or two sentence synopsis of the bill is
shown as well. Finally, the official summary for HB 301 was included (See Appendix C).
The next part of historical analysis involved identifying the context in which each of
these bills was passed. Media outlets providimg information on the bills during the time
period produced information for additional context. A Google News search for HB 301 and
sex offenders provided some current newspaper articles for examination. However, this did
not produce results for media sources with archived information. LexisNexis does make
archived newspaper articles available. Searching LexisNexis for newspaper articles in
Missouri from 1995 to 2013 produced many results with most newspaper articles coming
from The St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Additionally, the Missouri Digital News website,
www.mdn.org, also provided some archived newspaper articles. However, these
newspaper articles often presented the same information and quotes already located
within the LexisNexis articles. The Missouri Digital News did provide some information on
the voting for some bills by the Missouri General Assembly members. Over 100 newspaper
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articles were found and examined that discussed the issues concerning Missouri’s changing
sex offender laws.
Another layer in the historical analysis was the political makeup of Missouri’s
lawmaking bodies, the General Assembly and the governor’s office. Missouri’s General
Assembly consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate. Data on the partisanship of
these members was collected for the House of Representatives 163 members and the
Senate’s 34 members. Table 2 shows the number of legislators for each party (See
Appendix A). The political parties are Democrat (D), Republican (R), and Independent (I).
Sometimes the numbers will not always add up due to vacancies. However, it is not
believed that even if these vacancies had been filled they would have changed bill
outcomes a great deal. The vacancies were usually only one or two seats. Table 2 also
shows the political affiliation of Missouri’s governor.
Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) provided data regarding criminal offense rates.
Crimes that are officially reported to the police are then given to the FBI for compilation as
part of the UCR statistics. The FBI defines rape as carnal knowledge of a female against her
will. Attempted rapes are also included. Figure 1 shows the rape rates for both the U.S.
and MO from 1995 to 2012 provided by the UCR (see Appendix B). The NCVS is an annual
survey given to households around the nation. The survey uncovers victims who did not
officially report their crime to the police. The NCVS changed its methodologies in 2007 but
it is not believed that these changes make pre-2007 data incomparable with post-2007
data. The NCVS defines rape as forced sexual intercourse and includes both female and
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male victims. Sexual assault is defined as attacks or threats of attacks involving unwanted
sexual contact. Figure 2 shows the rape and sexual assault rates for the U.S. from 1993 to
2012 provided by the NCVS (see Appendix B).
Findings
Along with many other states in the mid-1990s, Missouri established a sex offender
registry. Commencing on January 1, 1995, Missouri law required anybody convicted of a
felony sex offense since July 1979 to file their fingerprints, photo, and address with the local
law enforcement agency in the community where they lived. This law included sex
offenders that had already been freed and out of prison for any amount of time. Even
though police would have this information, the information was not going to be made
available to the public. Failing to register was a misdemeanor with a fine of up to $1,000
and possibly a year in a county jail. At the time, Missouri’s prisons held about 2,600 rapists
and child sex abusers (Sorkin, 1994).
Public Safety
One of the driving forces behind establishing a sex offender registry in Missouri was
for the protection of potential victims. The concern about potential victims came about
because of two incidents in Missouri that occurred in 1993. The first incident involved
Angie Housman. Angie, age nine, was kidnapped on the way back to her house after being
dropped off by the bus, only to be found several days later tortured, sexually molested, and
her dead body bound to a tree (Zigman, 2013). The second incident involved ten year old
Cassidy Senter. Cassidy was kidnapped and beaten to death attempting to fight off a
potential rapist (The Southeast Missourian, 1994). Proponents of instituting a sex offender
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registry in Missouri stated that had a registry been established prior to these kidnappings,
law enforcement agencies may have been able to find and rescue the girls before they were
murdered (Browning, 1993). While these incidents caused fear and panic around Missouri,
nationally, the movement to start a national sex offender registry was well underway with
the 1989 abduction of Jacob Wetterling. Jacob Wetterling was 11 years old when he was
kidnapped at gunpoint while walking home (Browning, 1993). Proponents of a sex offender
registry used incidents such as these and hoped to stop future incidents by following and
tracking sex offenders released from prison. Congress named the bill after Jacob Wetterling
which stresses the importance Congress put on remembering these victims.
While the initial registration law prohibited the information from going public, the
public voice concerned about not knowing the sex offenders’ names. Many people thought
the public should know where sex offenders lived and who they were in order to protect
children. In fact, even police chiefs stated that the public should have this information in
order to prevent similar crimes. Registration alone does nothing to prevent reoffending,
but advocates of a registry argued a registry makes it easier to track and potentially find
repeat sex offenders quicker.
Perception of Sex Offenders
The enactment of a sex offender registry relies on the belief that sex offenders will
commit another sex offense once released from prison. It is especially hard to argue against
such a belief when parents of victimized children, such as Patty Wetterling, came out and
said that child sex offenders are perpetual offenders (Browning, 1993). Missourians,
including state senators and representatives, echoed this sentiment. In fact, the
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representative who sponsored the law said, “Many pedophiles can’t stop what they are
doing and become repeat offenders,” (Sorkin, 1994).
Politics of Lawmaking
Politics can help explain Missouri’s initiation of a sex offender registry because
politicians are the people putting these laws together. As stated above, there was an
extremely strong national movement to create a national sex offender registry. This
movement came to fruition with Congress passing the Jacob Wetterling Crimes against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act. This act required states to
establish a sex offender registry. Twenty four other states established a sex offender
registry before Congress passed the law. Missouri was not one of these states. However,
Missouri’s neighbor to the east, Illinois, did have a sex offender registry before federal law
mandated states establish a registry.
Prior to the passage of the federal law mandating states establish sex offender
registries, some Missouri politicians were open to the idea of Missouri establishing such a
registry. This included Attorney General Jay Nixon, who at the time showed interest in the
idea of a sex offender registry (Browning, 1993). As Table 2 shows, Democrats controlled
both houses of the Missouri General Assembly. With sponsorship coming from the
Democrats, there is no evidence that Republicans wanted to stop the bill from passing.
However, with federal law mandating a registry, opponents of any sort of registration bill
would have had their hands tied.
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1996 – 1999
The late 1990s saw five bills passed by the Missouri General Assembly impacting sex
offenders, mostly affecting punishment. In 1996, House Bill 974 established the new term
“predatory sexual offender,” and also established new minimum sentence guidelines for
certain offenses. In 1997, House Bill 104 allowed for the prosecution of a sexual offenses
involving an 18 year old or younger to commence within 10 years of the victim turning 18.
House Bill 883, also passed in 1997, clarified registration requirements for sex offenders.
Passed in 1998, House Bill 1405 did three things. First, it changed the number of days
requiring sex offenders to register and changed the punishment of failing to register a
second time as a class D felony. Second, HB 1405 allowed for the civil commitment of sexual
predators. Finally, HB 1405 allowed the public to request a sex offender list from law
enforcement agencies. Two bills passed during the 1999 legislation year. House Bill 348
required juvenile sex offenders to be put on the sex offender registry. These offenders
would be kept confidential and could have their name removed from the registry at the age
of 21 unless they were required to register as an adult. House Bill 852 allowed for anyone
who had committed a violently sexual offense to be recommitted after release even
without committing a new overt act.
Public Safety
The laws passed during this period are purposefully framed and argued toward the
protection of victims and future possible victims. Evidence is first presented in 1996’s HB
974 minimum sentencing guidelines. Proponents of these bills inferred that because victims
of sex crimes are generally children and females, punishment of the offenders should be
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harsh. Similarly, the belief was that potential victims of “predatory sexual offenders” must
feel safe; and in order to create such an atmosphere, advocates of the bill argued that these
offenders must be locked up. The minimum sentence for these sexual predators mandated
life with eligibility of parole. Given other circumstances, the minimum sentence for child
molesters was 15 years. Reinforcing this sentiment one state congresswoman stated that
lawmakers were not going to allow sex offenders “to prey on communities” (Young, 1996).
Echoing this Missouri’s Correction’s director stated that the bills “are aimed at keeping
dangerous sex offenders, such as rapists, in prison and off the streets,” (Lhotka, 1996).
This period did not produce the high profile cases similar to the kidnapping and
murders of Angie Housman and Cassidy Senter locally. However, on the national level, the
public’s attention centered on Megan Kanka. A twice convicted sex offender moved in
across the street from Megan’s house unknown to her parents. He eventually raped and
murdered Megan (Woo, 1995). Megan’s story spurred the national movement for sex
offender registries to be made public, resulting in notification laws. Even though this
incident happened in 1994, the United States Supreme Court ruled that public notification
laws were legal. Advocates of a safer public included the public notification provision in HB
1405. Advocates argued from the public’s viewpoint, knowing where sex offenders live is
supposed to make it easier to protect potential victims. In fact one politician stated that the
purpose of these notification laws is the protection of communities and that “knowledge is
the most powerful tool to deal with problems,” (Dunklin, 1999).
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Perception of Sex Offenders
The language of 1996’s HB 974 fed directly into the perception of sex offenders as
the term predatory implies an animalistic type of behavior with a predator stalking its prey.
The bill itself defines “predatory sexual offender” as anyone previously guilty of certain
sexual offenses and are now being tried for similar sexual offenses again (RSMo
558.018.5(1), 1996). In other words, these sex offenders reoffend. While their crimes are
very disgusting and revolting, lawmakers could have used other language such as
“habitual”. However, lawmakers purposefully chose predatory which instills a certain image
of a sex offender lurking in every dark area. Echoing this imagery on a national level, one
representative stated “No matter what we do, the minute they [sex offenders] get back on
the street, many of them resume their hunt for victims,” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 8,
1996).
1998’s civil commitment law also contributed to the perception of sex offenders as
being subhuman. Mainly, it played on the belief that these certain sexual offenders will
reoffend if let free. In fact one legislator stated, “there are people that are not curable,” in
referencing sex offenders (Young, 1996). Leading up to the passage of this bill, arguments
commenced as to the constitutionality of such a law. However, politicians made very clear
the necessity of such a commitment law. The governor stated, “many of these people [sex
offenders] have done these crimes before and are a great risk to do them again. And we
need more control over them,” (Holleman, 1996). HB 852 passed, in 1999, also adds to this
perception that sex offenders need to be controlled in the fear of them recidivating.
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The perception of sex offenders changed slightly with the advent of 1999’s HB 348
requiring the registration of juvenile sex offenders. Normally the perception was that sex
offenders are older males preying on young females. Now juveniles were added to the mix.
While it may be perceived that these juveniles are only being punished for having sex with a
minor, the law made it very clear that these offenses were similar to those of adult sex
offenders with the offenses being, “rape, forcible sodomy, child molestation, and sexual
abuse,” (RSMo 211.425.1, 1999).
Politics of Lawmaking
Democrats controlled both houses of the General Assembly during this period.
Despite the slim margin held by the Democrats, the bills passed with support from both
parties in both houses with a Democrat governor clearly advocating for tougher laws on sex
offenders. However, national politics and influence help explain Missouri’s actions. Both
members of Congress and President Clinton pushed for tougher sentences on sex offenders.
This helped create a national bipartisan trend in dealing with sex offenders. Additionally,
with the Supreme Court making notification laws legal, there seemed little reason for
Missouri not make its sex offender registry available to the public. Furthermore, both
Kansas and Illinois made their registries available to the public before Missouri’s went
public. Not wanting to become a place where sex offenders could hide from the public,
Missouri quickly followed suit. Moreover, Kansas passed their own civil commitment law
prior to Missouri’s civil commitment bill’s passage in 1998. Kansas’ civil commitment law
also reached the Supreme Court, and again the Court ruled the law constitutional. After
this ruling, Missouri politicians moved quickly to draw up and pass HB 1405. The bill’s
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sponsor admitted that Missouri must “stay as near as possible to the Kansas law because of
the close ruling by the court,” (Manning, 1997).
2000 – 2004
The Missouri General Assembly passed the next sex offender bilsl in 2002. Senate
Bills 758 and 1070, passed in 2002, both clarified and revised the laws regarding sex
offender registries. 2003’s passage of Senate Bill 184 required the sex offender registry to
be posted on the internet. In 2004, House Bill 1055 and Senate Bill 1000 both passed the
legislature. HB 1055 increased punishments for sex offenders but more importantly
imposed residential restrictions on sex offenders. SB 1000 required DNA samples to be
taken from sex offenders.
Public Safety
Even though the period did not produce highly sensationalized cases such as Angie
Housman, Cassidy Senter, or Megan Kanka, does not mean that public safety had gone by
the wayside. Proponents argued that the posting of the sex offender registry on the
internet with HB 184 makes it easier for the public to find information on sex offenders. As
discussed previously, the belief is that a better informed public makes communities safer.
The argument is that an informed public can keep potential victims away from sex
offenders. With the state auditor’s report indicating loopholes in the registry laws allowing
for some sex offenders not having to register, fear could have run rampant through
communities. However, the legislature moved quickly to rectify these loopholes with HB
758. Attempting to fix these loopholes gives the impression of creating safer
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neighborhoods. In fact, the state auditor admitted as much when saying, “This isn’t about
tracking down people to catch them. This is about public notification,” (Bryant, 2002).
Supporters of HB 1055 emphasized the need to keep sex offenders away from
potential victims, particularly children. The law prohibited sex offenders from establishing
“residency within one thousand feet of any public school or any private school giving
instruction in a grade or grades not higher than twelfth grade, or child care facility,” (RSMo
566.147.1, 2004). Supporters of the law advocated that protecting children is of the utmost
importance and that residential restrictions go a long way toward that goal. Proponents
reasoned that combining residential restrictions with the knowledge of where sex offenders
live gives the public options in trying to keep their children away from sex offenders.
Perception of Sex Offenders
While the previous period may have changed perceptions regarding who commits
sex offenses by adding juveniles to the registry, the laws passed during this period
reinforced the perception that sex offenders will reoffend. A driving force behind the
passage of HB 1055 centered on sex offenders reoffending by committing crimes against
children if given the opportunity. This plays on the perception that not only are sex
offenders bound to reoffend, but that they opportunists. Proponents of living restriction
laws argued that living by a school or child care facility creates a temptation that sex
offenders will not be able to resist.
Because of the belief that sex offenders will reoffend if given the opportunity,
keeping track of them is imperative to communities, law enforcement agencies, and
lawmakers. Hence, fixing the loopholes in the registry in order to keep track of them was
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imperative in 2002. The addition of DNA samples taken from sex offenders further adds to
the tracking mechanism. Now if a sex offender should reoffend, law enforcement agencies
have an additional tool to find recidivists. It gives the perception to sex offenders that they
are always being watched and will be caught if they stepped out of line.
Politics of Lawmaking
Following the 2000 elections, Republicans took control over the Missouri Senate by
a slim margin. Additionally after the 2002 elections, Republicans widened their margin of
control in the Missouri Senate while taking control of Missouri’s House of Representatives
by a significant margin. While Republicans enjoyed this control in the legislative branch,
Democrats still controlled the governor’s office. These political differences may help to
explain why SB 1070 passed through the General Assembly but was vetoed by the governor.
While Democrats ushered in punitive policies during the late 1990s, Republicans acted
similarly with the passage of 2004’s HB 1055, the most punitive bill passed during this
period. Despite the shift in party control, there appeared to be little opposition within the
General Assembly to the bills passed.
The passage of SBs 758 and 1070 may have been a direct response to political
pressure applied by other entities. The Missouri state auditor released a report indicating
many loopholes in the laws requiring sex offender registry (Bryant, 2002). These loopholes
allowed convicted sex offenders to avoid registration without consequence. The pressure
to clean up these loopholes in order to manage sex offenders helped explain the passage
and signing into law SB 758. Furthermore, Illinois had already posted its sex offender
registry online and thus, Missouri followed suit with SB 184 in 2003. Again Missouri did not
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want to be a safe haven for sex offenders from other states because it may be easier to
“hide” from the public.
2005 – 2009
The end of the first decade of the new millennium ushered in another barrage of
bills aimed at sex offenders. The first in 2005, Senate Bill 73, allowed for county law
enforcement officials to have their own registered sex offender websites. Previously, only
the Missouri State Highway Patrol had such a website. Passed in 2006, House Bill 1698
included many numerous provisions pertaining to sex offenders. First, it added information
that would be available to the public. This information included name and known aliases,
date of birth, physical description, photograph, description of offender’s vehicles, nature
and dates of offenses, date of which the offender was released, and compliance status of
offender (RSMo 43.650.4, 2006). Second, it required life imprisonment without eligibility
for parole for persistent sex offenders and sex offenders whose victim was twelve years old
or less. Third, the bill prohibited sex offenders from being present in or loitering within five
hundred feet of a school. Fourth, it added the crime of exposing the genitals in public as
sexually explicit conduct requiring registering as a sex offender. Fifth, it allowed certain
offenders, such as parents and legal guardians, to be removed from the registry and
allowed others to petition that their name be taken off the registry after ten years. Finally,
the law increased the punishment for failing to register. One important impact of 2008’s
Senate Bill 714 required juveniles over the age of fourteen to register as adult sex offenders
if the juveniles committed certain crimes. Senate Bill 932, also passed in 2008, created the
Cyber Crime Investigation Fund in order to investigate internet sex crimes. House Bill 826
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and Senate Bill 435 both allowed for the civil confinement of sexually violent predators in
county jails and passed in 2009. Finally, in 2009 Senate Bill 36 passed which allowed for the
life imprisonment for sexual crimes that were vile and inhuman against children.
Public Safety
Two national incidents involving child victims played an important role in the
barrage of bills that came out of this period. The first concerned Adam Walsh. The six year
old Adam was abducted and later found murdered. The other incident involved Jessica
Lunsford. A convicted sex offender abducted, raped, and murdered the 9 year old Jessica.
Both of these incidents influenced the bills passed during this period, especially HB 1698.
2009’s SB 36 also evidenced the need to protect children, emphasizing life imprisonment for
offenders who commit certain types of crime against children. In fact one legislator put the
onus on himself and his colleagues: “I think that it is vitally important that when a parent
sends a child off to school that it is the duty of us, as legislators, to do whatever we can to
see that they are safe,” (Kelly, 2006).
The Adam Walsh case certainly influenced the policies coming out against sex
offenders during this time. Congress named an act after the child in so that no one would
forget him. While HB 1698’s punitive measures can be linked to Adam Walsh’s case, other
bills such as SB 932 can also be linked to the Adam Walsh case. Proponents argued that the
need to protect potential child victims permeated everything, including the internet. With
this bill specifically allocating money for such a purpose, stronger arguments for protecting
children were made.
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The case of Jessica Lunsford played a crucial role in the development of HB 1698.
The fact that an already convicted sex offender committed another sex crime enraged both
the public and lawmakers. HB 1698’s extremely punitive measures might not do anything
to actually lower sex offense rates, but the message sent is clear: such acts committed,
especially by repeat offenders, will not be tolerated. Lawmakers wanted and succeeded in
bringing down the full authority of the law against sex offenders with this bill. They did not
see any problem in denying rights to sex offenders in order to protect children (Franck &
Rowden, 2006). Opponents of such tough laws argued that residential restrictions clearly
indicate a deprivation of rights.
Perception of Sex Offenders
Reaffirming the stereotypical perceptions of sex offenders reasserted itself during
this period. Prior to the passage of HB 1698, the general feeling that sex offenders are the
lowest of the low returned. Disgust generated the mandate for tougher sentences on sex
offenders. Some politicians went as far as to say, “lock the door and throw away the
key…the vermin would seduce our kids,” (Franck & Rowden, 2006). The image of a sex
offender seducing kids changed somewhat with the advancement of technology and the
internet. Now sex offenders could lure kids to them by chatting with them online. SB 932
allocated resources to make sure sex offenders would have a much harder time doing so.
Additionally, the feeling that sex offenders will recidivate re-emerged as well. One
supporter of HB 1698 did not think sex offenders could be cured (Franck, 2006a). To
reinforce the idea, one government official claimed, “We need to face the facts. We have
had little success at changing the behavior of child-sex offenders. Too many children have
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been permanently scarred for us not to take action to appropriately punish these evil
criminals,” (Franck, 2006a). Both HB 826 and SB 435 subtly hint at the notion of incurable
sex offenders. Keeping sex offenders in jails rather than some sort of rehabilitative center
gives the impression that sex offenders are the same as all the other criminals. It infers that
they did not have a disease or psychological problem but are just criminals. Proponents
argued that keeping them in jails further instills the idea that sex offenders do not get
better and should just stay in prison.
Politics of Lawmaking
The Missouri political scene shifted again during this period. After the 2004
elections, Republicans gained control of the governor’s office and increased their control of
the seats in both houses. In the Missouri House, Republicans controlled about 60 percent
of the seats while controlling almost 70 percent of the seats in the Missouri Senate. With
this much control in both houses and control of the governor’s office, Republicans
controlled all facets of the law making body in Missouri by a substantial margin. This
control significant because they could have gone in any direction they wanted to concerning
sex offenders. However, they kept the trend of becoming increasingly punitive on sex
offenders especially with HB 1698.
In addition to Republicans controlling the lawmaking process in Missouri, outside
pressures greatly influenced the bills passed by the Missouri General Assembly during this
time period. Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. The
Act expanded the National Sex Offender Registry and started taskforces that were
designated to investigate internet sex crimes against children. The Adam Walsh Child
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Protection and Safety Act influenced the creation of SB 932, and Missouri had to pass such a
law in order to meet federal regulations. Furthermore, Florida passed a new sex offender
law which was touted as the toughest law in the nation at the time. Iowa and New Mexico
also passed laws viewed as extremely tough on sex offenders. These events and these
other state’s laws greatly influenced the General Assembly to push for passing HB 1698. In
fact one of the Missouri State senator’s modeled HB 1698 after the Florida law and took it a
step further in order for Missouri to become one of the toughest states on sex offenders
(Franck & Rowden, 2006). In describing the legislation, the initial sponsor stated, “I have
proposed the most aggressive legislation on child molestation, predator child-sex crimes
this session and I think that’s a good place to start,” (Franck & Rowden, 2006). In terms of
creating more punitive bills one legislator put it, “You kind of have one-upmanship in terms
of who can be the toughest” (Franck, 2006b).
The Missouri courts played an important role during this time as well. In a 2006
decision, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that registered sex offenders who had
committed crimes before the establishment of the registration in 1995 were not required to
register. This ruling removed numerous offenders from the sex offender registry. Some
Missouri state legislators reacted strongly to this ruling and in the senate passed a bill that
would allow sex offender registry laws to be applied retroactively. Surprisingly though, the
Missouri House did not pass the bill. While it may seem that sex offenders had finally
gained a slight victory, the Missouri Supreme Court made another ruling in 2009. This ruling
decided that federal law mandated all sex offenders be registered even if their crimes had
been committed before the registration law went into effect in 1995.
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2010 -2013
The Missouri General Assembly passed two bills during this period. First, in 2011,
Senate Bill 250 passed, requiring sex offenders to complete certain treatment programs
prior to being eligible for parole or conditional release. Finally, in 2013, the General
Assembly passed House Bill 301. The first provision of HB 301 removed the names of
juvenile sex offenders from the sex offender registry website. A second provision called for
judges to sentence a sex offender to an extended term of imprisonment for having
committed certain offenses. Previously, the law called for an extended term of
imprisonment only for persistent sex offenders. Another provision called for the sentences
of multiple sex offenses to run consecutively rather than concurrently. Finally, the bill
allowed certain sex offenders to petition for their name to be removed from the registry
after five years.
Public Safety
Public safety came to the forefront with the veto of HB 301. Governor Nixon listed
off several reasons explaining his veto in his letter to the Missouri General Assembly. The
governor’s first reason emphasized public safety. Governor Nixon stated that the Missouri
sex offender registry website received just over four million visits in the previous year,
implying that Missourians do find the information useful (McDermott, 2013). He argued
that by taking names off the registry, Missourians would be deprived of information that
pertains to public safety. Governor Nixon also reasoned that an informed public helps law
enforcement agencies solve sex offense cases (Ruess, 2013). Governor Nixon stated his
worry was that with the passage of HB 301, Missouri could attract more sex offenders. He
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specifically stated, “the Speaker stands ready to help these offenders hide from the public,”
(McDermott, 2013).
Governor Nixon next argued that removal of these sex offenders from the registry
disrespected the victims of these crimes. “Moreover, the bill would deprive victims of sex
offenses the opportunity to be heard before an offender is removed from the very websites
that are designed to protect victims and other members of the public,” (Nixon, 2013). Here
Governor Nixon emphasized that the bill would in essence repeal the importance of victims.
The governor wanted to make it clear that it is the victims that should be remembered not
concern for the offender.
Perception of Sex Offenders
Proponents of the bill argued against the governor’s veto by attempting to change
the perception of sex offenders. The sponsor of the bill claimed that not everyone on the
sex offender registry need to be feared (Ruess, 2013). Some of the people that could fall
into this category would be a juvenile having consensual sex with another juvenile. Others
could be offenders who urinate in public. These types of offenders are not the stereotypical
sex offenders that the public most often thinks of in reference to sex offenders. Supporters
of B 301 claimed that these are not the offenders that prey on children like monsters.
Proponents of the bill deemed that the juveniles removed from the registry with this bill
had “served their debt to society. They are adults now and haven’t done anything wrong
since.” (McDermott, 2013). They argued that these youths who commit such crimes
deserve to get their lives back.
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Politics of Lawmaking
Republicans again accumulated a large margin of control in both houses of the
General Assembly. In the House they controlled approximately 68 percent of the seats and
almost 70 percent of the seats in the Senate. HB 301 passed the house with 153 votes and
passed with senate with 28 votes with only 4 votes in opposition. Even with the
Republicans majority in both houses, Democrats voted to pass the bill as well. The passage
showed bipartisan support for the bill. However, Governor Jay Nixon, a Democrat, vetoed
the bill. His reasons are stated above, but part of the unseen reasoning could be due to
politics. He may have wanted to resist Republican-initiated policies. The Republican
leadership originally vowed to override the veto. In order to do so, Democrats would have
needed to vote against their governor. It seemed though that democrats were not willing
to do so and would not promise to vote to override the veto. Republicans eventually
withdrew the motion to override the veto.
Discussion
The findings discussed above present evidence lending itself to certain conclusions.
Referring to the basic questions posed earlier help explain the significance of HB 301. What
was the general trend of sex offender laws and how does HB 301 fit? The findings showed
that laws became increasingly more punitive toward sex offenders based on the bills passed
from 1995 to 2013. There was a general tone of punitiveness from politicians justifying the
need for passing these ever increasingly punitive bills. The Missouri General Assembly took
a chance to break this pattern with HB 301. HB 301 dealt with juvenile offenders so it may
not have been a complete break away from the current trend. However, it was a step in the
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other direction. Nevertheless, Governor Nixon continued in the pattern of punitiveness
with his veto.
How do current sociological and political theories of policy creation explain the
actions surrounding HB 301? While the process of creating laws concerning sex offenders is
most undoubtedly a complex process with many factors, the three main themes of public
safety, perception of sex offenders, and the politics of lawmaking can explain the actions
surrounding HB 301. In short, concerns about public safety and the perception of sex
offenders go hand in hand with both political parties endorsing punitive measures against
sex offenders. HB 301 presents a situation where partisan politics may be emerging that
pits public safety verses the perception of sex offenders. These themes are discussed in
further detail below.
Public Safety
Concerns about public safety was undoubtedly a driving force behind a majority of
the laws passed in Missouri from the late 1990s to 2013. The mandate for a sex offender
registry to be implemented in Missouri can partially be attributed to the need to feel safe
from sex offenders. After initially establishing the sex offender registry, it became
paramount that the public should have access to this information. The logic is that by
informing the public, parents and guardians can keep their children away from dangerous
sex offenders. Even though such public notification laws faced legal challenges, thereby
stalling such laws in Missouri, once judged legal, Missouri quickly moved to make the
information public. As technology advanced with the rapid improvement of the internet,
the information provided by the sex offender registry could be accessed by countless
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individuals. The breadth of information made available on these registry websites allowed
the public to know everything about sex offenders especially with the passage of HB 1698.
The use of knowledge lends itself to the ideas of Foucault. Foucault proposed that
extensive surveillance produces knowledge which produces power (Garland, 1990). With
the amount of information provided to citizens and all the tracking measures, sex offenders
are under constant surveillance. All of these measures are an attempt to force sex
offenders to live a certain way and to police themselves. By not being able to hide, sex
offenders are forced into complacency. Residential restrictions also passed under the ethos
of public safety. By limiting where sex offenders can live, Missouri lawmakers impressed
upon the public the need for safe communities.
Remembering victims and protecting people from future victimization inherently lay
behind these public safety laws. Stories of child victims being kidnapped, raped, and
murdered spurred the Missouri legislature to pass extremely punitive laws. In the 1990s,
the local victims, Angie Housman and Cassidy Senter became the reason for establishing a
sex offender registry. Officials stated numerous times that had a sex offender registry
already been in place, locating the two girls would have been easier and given law
enforcement agencies a chance to rescue the girls. However, local victims were usually not
referred to often even in local legislation. National stories such as Adam Walsh and Jessica
Lunsford spurred a national movement in the mid-2000s to pass even tougher laws on sex
offenders. The evidence lent itself to the conclusion that story upon story of a different sex
offender case is not needed. Rather, the few highly sensationalized cases drew much
attention and concern reaffirmed Galeste, Fradella and Vogel’s (2012) argument. Often
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time laws included the name of the victim in order for everyone to remember why these
laws should be passed. These few cases provided support for Sample and Kadleck’s (2008)
affirmation that a highly sensationalized case causes tension in the public which eventually
leads to policy change. HB 1698 can also be seen as a direct response to the Adam Walsh
and Jessica Lunsford incidents because both of events occurred in Florida, not Missouri.
Governor Nixon used public safety arguments in his veto of HB 301. Whether or not HB 301
would have really impacted public safety is not the issue. However, the perception of public
safety being impacted by HB 301 creates a compelling argument. Who can argue against
the protection of children? Despite reasons given, those who advocated for HB 301 come
off as not protecting communities and almost defending sex offenders. While this is
certainly not the case, using public safety in order to defend the veto creates a very tough
argument to fight against. The laws regarding the public safety concerning sex offenders
hinged on the argument that children need special protection, and reaffirmed Zimring’s
(2004) conclusion. Furthermore, there is almost a Durkhemian logic behind these public
safety arguments (Garland, 1990). The laws passed increased punishments in order to
reaffirm that certain crimes were not tolerated in communities. Communities rallied
around and agreed upon punishing those who harmed children. It created a certain
cohesiveness and solidarity among community members.
Perception of Sex Offenders
The establishment of a sex offender registry in Missouri shaped and reflected certain
perceptions of sex offenders. The perception was that sex offenders needed to be tracked
because they were a danger to the community. 1996’s HB 974 use of the term predatory
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sex offender played on this perception. By using this type of language, lawmakers
reinforced the notion that these sex offenders will stalk and prey on unsuspecting victims.
Simon (1998) argued that this type of language lumps sex offenders together instead of
focusing on individuals. The language of HB 974 reaffirmed this argument by naming sex
offenders as predators which led to the enactment of laws that are extremely punitive
toward all sex offenders. This is exemplified by the sheer number of laws passed in the late
1990s and then with the extremely punitive measures enacted by HB 1698 in 2006. Along
with this tracking for public safety mentality, tracking also infers that sex offenders will
reoffend. Lawmakers often used language such as “incurable” to describe sex offenders. By
using such language lawmakers and other public figures reinforced this notion of impending
recidivism in the public’s mind.
Proponents of HB 301 go against the standard perception of sex offenders.
Admittedly, HB 301 focuses on removing juvenile offenders from the registry. It could have
been a response to such studies by Christiansen and Vincent (2013) and Zimring (2004),
showing that juvenile sex offenders tend to not recidivate very much if at all. However,
proponents did not explicitly use juvenile sex offender research as a reason for the
justification of HB 301. Instead, they attempted to change the perception that the sex
offenders affected by HB 301 are not dangerous. Because the sex offender registry includes
a plethora of crimes requiring registration, the public perceives anybody on the registry as
dangerous. Proponents attempted to change this perception. The examples given are of
juveniles having consensual sex and people who displayed their genitals in public. These
types of offenders are neither dangerous to the community nor at risk to recidivate at high
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levels. These offenders do not fit the image of the monsters or predators established by
earlier laws. Proponents said these offenders paid their price and it is time to let them get
on with their lives without the sex offender stigma attached. HB 301 evidenced the need
for clarification of who are the dangerous sex offenders. It also showed the problem with
becoming extremely punitive toward one group of criminals without thinking of
consequences further down the road. Everybody on the sex offender registry is under the
umbrella of dangerous and terrible predators. HB 301 took an initial step at changing the
perception.
Politics of Lawmaking
The bills passed in the late 1990s and first decade of the 2000s reaffirmed the
extremely punitive attitude of both political parties. When Democrats had control of both
houses and the governor’s office they kept passing bill after bill targeting sex offenders in
order to increase punishments. When Republicans took control of both houses and
eventually the governor’s office, they continued the trend established by the Democrats.
Republicans had their chance to reverse the trend when they had major control of both
houses and the governor’s office after the 2004 elections. With their majority and the
governor’s backing, Republicans had the opportunity to act differently. However, they
passed one of the most punitive laws regarding sex offenders in 2006 with HB 1698. Figures
1 and 2 provide proof that these policies were not driven by crime statistics. Both figures
show that rape rates and sexual assault rates were decreasing and yet both political parties
continued to initiate punitive policies. While the figures focus primarily on national trends,
it is not believed Missouri would differ greatly from these trends. Figure 1 does show the
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specific rape rate in MO provided by the UCR while it is slightly more sporadic, the general
trend is still decreasing. The argument is made that Republican initiated HB 1698 in 2006
could have been a reaction to increasing rape rates in Missouri which Figure 1 shows.
However, this was not the reason given. Politicians focused on the national cases involving
children. Crime rates were not used as justification for the need of these policies.
However, going against this trend, HB 301 called into question the current political
explanation of punitive legislation. Republicans again had a large majority in both houses in
2013. To pass a bill that is viewed as soft on crime is contrary to both the perception of
Republicans on crime control and the general trend of Missouri politics leading up to 2013.
Republican leadership who supported the bill reasoned that sex offender laws have become
overly broad, echoing the same conclusion that Sample and Kadleck (2008) found.
Republicans passed the bill with the Democrats support as well. As one St. Louis PostDispatch (2013) editorial put it, the Republican led General Assembly attempted a “smart
on crime” stance with HB 301. However, Nixon, a Democrat, vetoed the bill. There are a
couple of reasons for this. First, Nixon could just be continuing the general trend of
Missouri politics. The study showed both parties being extremely punitive toward sex
offenders during the time period with Nixon continuing the pattern. Second, and possibly
more importantly, Nixon was the state attorney general in Missouri from 1993 to 2009.
During his entire tenure as state attorney general, Missouri passed extremely punitive laws
regarding sex offenders. Nixon was state attorney general at a time when everyone jumped
on the “get tough” on crime bandwagon. Come 2013 when Nixon can be progressive in
dealing with sex offenders, he reverted to what he knows best, punitive measures against

40

sex offenders. During Nixon’s entire career, he supported these punitive measures against
sex offenders. To support HB 301 could be viewed as flip flopping on his previous stances.
With Nixon setting the tone, Democrats in the Missouri General assembly did not want to
go against him and would not have supported an override of his veto. This is a hidden
power of the governor’s office. General Assembly members in the same party as the
governor can vote for measures they know will never become actual law. This allows them
to save face with their constituents while not compromising party lines.
Additionally, national politics played an important role in the bills passed by the
Missouri General Assembly. As discussed above, the incidents involving children victims
around the nation spurred states to initiate and pass punitive bills regarding sex offenders.
Missouri acted no differently. On numerous occasions, lawmakers concerned themselves
with Missouri possibly being a safe haven for sex offenders. In fact, one of Nixon’s reasons
for vetoing HB 301 was due to the possibility that with such a law, sex offenders could hide
from the public by moving to Missouri. Furthermore, Kansas and Illinois often passed laws,
such as public notification laws, before Missouri. Missouri lawmakers did not want to fall
behind the actions of other states and quickly moved to make Missouri just as punitive as
their neighbors and sometimes even going further than other states. This reaffirmed
Campbell and Schoenfeld’s (2013) notion of the diffusion of policies between national and
local politics. Even though Missouri may have wanted a sex offender registry prior to 1995,
it took national incidents and eventually federal law for Missouri to finally establish a
registry. Continuing this push, President Clinton spoke very negatively about sex offenders
in the late 1990s which helped to explain why Democrats in Missouri continued to push
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through punitive legislation during the late 1990s. Furthering this notion that national and
outside influences are needed for change was the absence of national movements for sex
offender law reform. The media outlets examined presented no evidence of other states or
national leaders indicating change was needed. Had there been such a movement, HB 301
might have had a different outcome.
Conclusion
This study sought to explain why Missouri’s General Assembly passed HB 301 in
2013 only to have the bill vetoed by the governor, preventing it from becoming law. HB 301
centered on the sex offender registry, particularly the removal of certain juvenile sex
offenders from the registry. In an effort to understand the motivation behind the various
actions associated with HB 301, this study examined the historical context and evolution of
Missouri’s sex offender laws from 1995 to 2013. After examining bills passed by the
Missouri General Assembly and media sources concerning these bills certain themes
emerged. Three key factors shaped the legislative trajectory of the state’s sex offender
registry: claims that further sanctions were necessary to ensure public safety, the negative
and intractable perception of sex offenders, and the politics of lawmaking.
The main questions this study attempted to answer focused on current sex offender
policy trends and the policy creation process itself. What are the current trends of sex
offender laws and how does HB 301 fit? This study showed that leading up to HB 301, the
Missouri General Assembly passed increasingly punitive policies concerning sex offenders.
This is not surprising seeing as this time period had increasing punitiveness for all crime
policies both in Missouri and nationwide. HB 301 represented a possible step in the other
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direction. HB 301 dealt with juvenile sex offenders and sex offenders who commit less
serious offenses. Removing them from the registry could be seen as a small step in
reversing the trend toward extremely punitive policies that categorize and stigmatize both
minor and serious offenders. While not a total reversal, the law did represent a more
measured approach that treated young and less serious offenders differently than most
serious offenders.
The second question addressed how well current sociological and political theories
of policy creation explain the actions surrounding HB 301. Prior to HB 301, sex offender
legislation could be viewed as concern over public safety, the perception of sex offenders,
and bipartisan political rhetoric pushing for increasingly punitive policies regarding sex
offenders. All three of these elements worked in tandem with each other. However, the
advent of HB 301 presents a new story. The political differences between Missouri
Republicans and the Democratic Governor Jay Nixon open the possibility that partisan
politics could be returning to crime policy. This partisanship has pitted public safety verses
the changing perception of sex offenders. HB 301 introduces the possibility of the concern
over public safety, the perception of sex offenders, and the politics of lawmaking no longer
working in tandem with each other to produce punitive policies.
Hence, these results lead to further questions that can be addressed in future
research. Are partisan politics in crime policy really returning? Are Missouri Republicans
going to try and continue this “smart” crime position while Democrats hold on to the
“tough” on crime position? Furthermore, can the perception of low-level sex offenders be
changed to the point that it can offset the worries of public safety? HB 301 attempted to do
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this, but ultimately concerns for public safety won out. Additionally, this study presented
no measurement of the public’s attitude concerning any of the bills examined. Gaging how
the public feels about sex offender policies can add another layer of analysis not explored in
this study. It could be that a bill such as HB 301 can succeed if it has public support. Is
there a public outcry for reforming sex offender laws or will one make itself known? Time
will answer these questions. Time will determine as to whether HB 301 truly was the
beginning of new developments or just more of the same.
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Appendix A

Table 1: Source Missouri General Assembly Bills Truly Agreed and Passed, 1995-2013

Year
1996

Bill No.
HB 974

1997

HB 104

1997
1998
1999
1999

HB 883
HB 1405
HB 348
HB 852

2002
2002
2003

SB 758
SB 1070
SB 184

2004

HB 1055

2004
2005

SB 1000
SB 73

2006
2008

HB 1698
SB 714

2008

SB 932

2009

HB 826

2009

SB 36

2009

SB 435

2011

SB 250

2013

HB 301

Summary
Required minimum sentencing for certain sexual
offenders
Allowed prosecution of sexual offenses involve persons
18 years of younger to be commenced within 10 years
Clarified registration requirements for sex offenders
Allowed for the civil commitment of sexual predators
Requires registration of juvenile sex offenders
Allowed for a convicted sex offender to be confined
after 10 years of being released without having
committed a new offense
Clarified registration requirements for sex offenders
Revised offender registry
Required the sex offender registry be posted on the
internet
Implemented residential restrictions for sex offenders
and added harsher penalties for certain offenses
Required DNA samples from sex offenders
Allowed county law enforcement agencies to have sex
offender registry website
Changed numerous laws regarding sex offenses
Required juveniles over the age of 14 to register as adult
sex offenders
Allocated money for the specific purpose of
investigating internet sex crimes against children
Allowed Department of Mental Health to contract with
county jails for the confinement of sexually violent
predators
Modifies provisions relating to sexual offenses against
children
Allowed Department of Mental Health to contract with
county jails for the confinement of sexually violent
predators
Required sexual assault offenders to complete certain
programs before release on parole
Changed the laws regarding certain sexual offenses
including the removal of certain juvenile offenders from
the registry
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Table 2: Political Makeup of the Missouri general Assembly and Governor’s Office

Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

D
87
88
87
86
85
84
88
87
71
73
65
66
71
70
74
74
56
56
53

House
R
76
74
74
75
75
76
75
76
90
90
98
97
92
91
89
88
106
106
110

Senate
I

1
2
2
2

1

D
19
19
19
19
18
18
16
16
13
14
11
11
13
14
11
11
8
8
10

Governor
R
15
15
15
15
16
16
18
18
20
20
23
23
21
20
23
23
26
26
24

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
R
R
R
R
D
D
D
D
D
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Appendix B
Figure 1: Source Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, 1995-2012
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Figure 2: Source Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1993-2012
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Appendix C

SCS HB 301 -- PRISONER RE-ENTRY PROGRAM AND SEXUAL OFFENSES
(Vetoed by the Governor)
This bill changes the laws regarding certain sexual offenses and sexually violent offenders
and establishes a prisoner re-entry program for certain offenders.
JUVENILES ON THE SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRY
Beginning August 28, 2013, the information of a sexual offender whose offense was
committed when he or she was younger than 18 years of age cannot be listed on the State
Highway Patrol's Sexual Offender Registry website and any offender currently on the
website who was required to register as a sexual offender based on an offense that
occurred when he or she was younger than 18 years of age must be immediately removed
from the website.
The bill allows any person on the sexual offender registry who was a juvenile certified as an
adult and convicted of a felony under Chapter 566, RSMo, regarding sexual offenses, that
was equal to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse under federal law or any person
14 years of age or older at the time of the offense who was adjudicated for an offense that
was equal to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse under federal law to file a
petition for removal from the registry. The petition cannot be filed until five years have
passed from the later of the date the offender was found guilty of the offense requiring
registration or the date the offender was released from custody for the offense. If the
person was convicted outside of Missouri, he or she must be a resident of Missouri for at
least five years before filing the petition. The court must grant the petition and enter an
order directing the removal of the offender's name and information from the registry unless
it finds that the offender has been adjudicated of or has charges pending for failure to
register or for a subsequent sexual offense that would require registration that occurred
after the date the person initially registered; has not successfully completed any required
period of supervised release, probation, or parole; or has not been a Missouri resident for
at least five years. If the petition is not granted solely because he or she had pending
charges for failure to register or an additional offense that requires registration and the
charges are subsequently dismissed or he or she is acquitted of the charges, the person may
file a new petition at any time after the dismissal or acquittal. If the denial is based on a
finding of guilt for an offense that would require registration, no successive petition can be
filed. If the denial is based on a finding of guilt for failure to register, the person may file a
new petition after five years. If the denial is based on the petitioner not completing a
required period of supervised release, probation, or parole, the person may file a new
petition at any time after successfully completing the period of release, probation, or
parole. Beginning August 28, 2013, regardless of whether an offender's petition is granted
under these provisions, the information regarding any person whose offense was
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committed when he or she was younger than 18 years of age must be immediately removed
from the patrol's sexual offender website and any local law enforcement website allowed
under Section 589.402.
SEXUAL OFFENSES
The bill:
(1)
Renames the crime of forcible rape to rape in the first degree and specifies that a
person commits the crime if he or she has sexual intercourse with an individual who is
incapacitated, incapable of consent, or lacks the capacity to consent or by the use of
forcible compulsion;
(2)
Renames the crime of forcible sodomy to sodomy in the first degree and specifies
that a person commits the offense if he or she has deviate sexual intercourse with another
person who is incapacitated, incapable of consent, or lacks the capacity to consent or by the
use of forcible compulsion;
(3)

Renames the crime of sexual assault to rape in the second degree;

(4)

Renames the crime of deviate sexual assault to sodomy in the second degree;

(5)
Renames the crime of sexual abuse to sexual abuse in the first degree and specifies
that a person commits the offense if he or she subjects another person to sexual contact
when that person is incapacitated, incapable of consent, or lacks the capacity to consent or
by the use of forcible compulsion;
(6)
Renames the crime of "sexual misconduct in the second degree" to "sexual
misconduct in the first degree";
(7)
Renames the crime of "sexual misconduct in the third degree" to "sexual misconduct
in the second degree";
(8)
Renames the crime of "sexual misconduct" to "sexual abuse in the second degree";
(9) Specifies that a real estate broker's or salesperson's license must also be revoked and an
applicant must also not be issued a license if the licensee or applicant has pleaded guilty to,
entered a plea of nolo contrendere to, or been found guilty of rape in the first or second
degree, forcible rape, sodomy in the first or second degree, or sexual abuse in the first or
second degree;
(10) Specifies that a prosecution for rape in the first degree, attempted rape in the first
degree, sodomy in the first degree, or attempted sodomy in the first degree may be
commenced at any time;
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(11) Defines the terms "domestic violence," "family," and "household member" as they
apply to certain information that an insurance company cannot disclose to be the same as
they are defined in Section 455.010;
(12) Specifies that a prosecution for an unlawful sexual offense involving a person 18
years old or younger must be commenced within 30 years after the victim reaches the age
of 18 unless the prosecution is for rape in the first degree, attempted rape in the first
degree, sodomy in the first degree, or attempted sodomy in the first degree, in which case
the prosecution may be commenced at any time;
(13) Includes being in a drug-induced state or for any other reason being manifestly
unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment to the list of
those who are incapable of giving consent to sexual activity; and
(14) Repeals the provision which specifies that a person is not incapacitated with respect
to an act committed upon him or her if he or she became unconscious, unable to appraise
the nature of the person's conduct, or unable to communicate unwillingness to an act after
consenting to the act.
PRISONER RE-ENTRY PROGRAM
A prisoner re-entry program is established within the Department of Corrections to assist
offenders who have served their full sentences without early release and are locating to the
City of St. Louis upon release. Subject to appropriations, moneys for the program must be
appropriated to the department which must transfer the funds to the City of St. Louis's
Department of Health and Human Services which will administer the fund. The city must be
responsible for the issuance of a request for proposals to organizations with demonstrated
experience in providing re-entry services, including facilitating connections to providers of
housing and employment services and physical health, mental health, substance abuse, and
other social services. The city and the selected contractor must be jointly responsible to the
department for ensuring that the services are provided and must provide the department
with all data and records necessary to oversee and measure the effectiveness of the
program. The department director is authorized to enter into contracts as are necessary
and proper for the implementation of the program.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS
Currently, the Department of Corrections must provide a report and recommendations for
terms and conditions of probation to the court after 100 days of incarceration if the
department determines that an offender is not successful in a program. The court must
then release the offender on probation or order the offender to remain incarcerated to
serve the sentence imposed. The bill specifies that if the department determines the
offender has not successfully completed a 120-day program, the offender must be removed
from the program and the court advised of the removal. The department may recommend
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the terms and conditions of probation. The court has the power to grant probation or order
the execution of the offender's sentence. The court must consider other authorized
dispositions if the court is advised that an offender is not eligible for placement in a 120-day
program. Except when an offender has been found to be a predatory sexual offender, the
court must request the department to conduct a sexual offender assessment if the
defendant has pled guilty or been found guilty of a class B sexual abuse felony. The bill
repeals a provision requiring the court to request certain offenders be placed in the sexual
offender assessment unit of the department and requires the department to provide to the
court a report on the offender and may provide recommendations for terms and conditions
of an offender's probation. The sexual offender assessment must not be considered a 120day program. The bill specifies the process for granting probation to an offender who has
completed the assessment.
SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDERS
The bill revises the definition of "sexually violent offense" for purposes of civil commitment
to include sexual abuse in the first degree; sexual assault in the first degree; deviate sexual
assault in the first degree; the act of abuse of a child involving sexual contact, a prohibited
sexual act, sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation of a minor; or any felony offense that
contains elements substantially similar to these offenses.
Currently, a sexually violent predator who has been civilly committed is allowed to petition
the court for conditional release over the objections of the Director of the Department of
Mental Health. The petition must be served upon the court that committed the person, the
department director, the head of the facility housing the offender, and the Attorney
General. The bill requires the petition to also be served to the prosecuting attorney of the
jurisdiction into which the committed person is to be released.
The Department of Corrections must provide, upon request, access by the chief of the local
law enforcement agency to the information gathered by the global positioning system or
other technology used to monitor a person who has been granted conditional release from
the department upon the determination by a court or jury that he or she is not likely to
commit acts of sexual violence if released when the person is being electronically monitored
and remains in the county, city, town, or village where the releasing facility is located. The
information obtained must be closed and cannot be disclosed to any person outside the
agency except upon an order of the court supervising the conditional release.
The bill specifies that it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law
interpretations on the meaning of or definition of "sexually violent offense" to include, but
not be limited to, holdings in Robertson v. State, 392 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. App. W.D., 2012); and
State ex rel. Whitaker v. Satterfield, 386 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. App. S.D., 2012), and all cases
citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases. These provisions are to be applied
retroactively.
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The provisions of the bill regarding the revision of the definition of "dangerous felony" in
Section 556.061 and the provisions regarding sexually violent offenses in Section 632.480
contain an emergency clause.

